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We assess the relevance of budgetary components for private and public investment using 
data for a panel of 95 countries for the period 1970-2008, and accounting for the usually 
encountered econometric pitfalls. Our results show a positive effect attributed to total 
government expenditures and to public investment in fostering private investment, and 
negative effects of government expenditure on wages and government consumption spending 
on private investment. Interest payments and subsidies have a negative effect on both types of 
investment (particularly in the emerging economies sub-group). Social security spending has 
a negative effect on private investment for the full and OECD samples, whereas government 
health spending has a positive and significant impact on private investment. 
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Investment is key to economic growth. In fact, the theories of investment dating back to 
Keynes (1936), first called attention to the existence of an independent investment function in 
the economy. It is important to distinguish between private and public investment, particularly 
as similar arguments could also apply to the latter and, perhaps more interestingly, public 
investment may have differentiated (or at least unclear) effects on growth.1  
Regarding the determinants of publicly funded investment little research has been 
conducted. This lack of analysis is especially surprising, as in a great majority of countries 
throughout the world productive government services have declined as percentage of GDP 
since the 1970s. Several hypothesis have been put forward to explain the downtrend in public 
investment, including, extensive privatisation and the drive toward a smaller economic role of 
the state in the past two or three decades; the emergence of alternative ways to finance 
infrastructure investment (public-private partnerships); and, in the EU, the impact of the 
EMU’s fiscal rules. According to Mehrotra and Valila (2006), these hypotheses can be 
refuted. Privatisation is unlikely to have affected public investment as any investment 
undertaken by public enterprises is recorded in national accounts as investment of the 
enterprise sector. Secondly, it is also unlikely that any political drive toward a smaller 
economic role for the state has been very important; after all, regardless of the measure used, 
governments have not become smaller in recent decades.2 Finally, public-private partnerships 
remain a new and residual phenomenon in most advanced countries. 
Against this background, it appears that there remain gaps in our understanding of the 
determinants of investment (and public in particular).3 All in all, fragmented studies cannot be 
combined into a coherent investment theory. To fill some of the gaps, we employ a cross-
section time series analysis (due to the absence of reliable microdata) and aim notably at 
assessing which budgetary components have been driving (or determine) private and public 
investment. 
With this in mind, we use cross-sectional/time series data for a large panel of developed 
and developing countries for the period 1970-2008. In the empirical estimations we use 
_____________________________ 
1 Nelson and Singh (1994) looking at 70 developing countries (Low Income Countries and Middle Income 
Countries) for two distinct time periods (1970-79; 1980-89) and find that the effects of public investment on 
growth are mixed. 
2 See Afonso and Jalles (2011a) for a recent theoretical and empirical analysis on the – negative – impact of 
government size on macroeconomic performance. 
3 Even though econometric evidence (Beddies, 1999; Ghura and Hadjimichael, 1996; Ghura, 1997) indicates 
that, all in all, private investment has a stronger, more favourable effect on growth rather than government or 
public investment, probably because private investment is more efficient and less closely associated with rent-
seeking activities and corruption. 
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growth specifications and address several of the econometric caveats that usually plague such 
empirical work: outliers, simultaneity, endogeneity, cross-sectional dependence, causality, 
nonlinearities and threshold effects. Specifically, we examine the following issues: the 
influence of budgetary components on private and public investment levels; the relevance of 
different government debt and budget deficit ratios thresholds for the determinants of 
investment; the robustness of the results to different econometric specifications and between 
country groups; the existence of panel Granger causality; and the relevance of numerical 
fiscal rules for government investment in the EMU? 
The contributions of our paper to the literature include: i) the assessment of the budgetary 
determinants of private and public investment with a diversified variety of methods, providing 
sensitivity and robustness and dealing notably with model uncertainty; ii) the study of the 
relevance of economic and functional government expenditure categories and of revenue sub-
components; iii) panel Granger causality tests, and the assessment of the existence of cross-
sectional dependence within homogeneous groups of countries.  
In a nutshell, our results comprise notably of the following: 
1. Population growth has a positive impact on both types on investment, whereas, in 
general, initial GDP per capita hampers investment. The age structure of a country 
also affects investment: for private investment a higher dependency ratio has a 
negative impact, whereas for public investment the effect is reversed. 
2. Each government revenue component (when introduced individually) does not 
significantly affect private or public investment in OECD countries. However, taxes 
on income, profits and capital gains as well as social security contributions have a 
statistically significant positive impact on public investment for the full sample and 
emerging economies.  
3. Decomposing government expenditures, we get that interest payments and subsidies 
have a negative effect on both types of investment (particularly in the emerging 
economies sub-group).  
4. Regarding functional government spending, social security spending has a statistically 
negative effect on private investment, whereas government health spending appears 
with a positive and significant coefficient for private investment.  
5. Non-linearities in deficit or debt in percentage of GDP matter for public investment 
but not that much for private investment levels. 
6. Cross-sectional dependence regressions suggest that government revenues have a 
detrimental effect on private investment, and the reverse is true for public investment. 
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7. Granger causality tests find evidence supporting causality running for GDP to private 
investment and the reverse appears to be stronger (with both positive short and long-
run effects).  
8. We also find statistically significant negative coefficients on the overall EU fiscal rule 
index and the budget balance rule index, meaning that although better fiscal numerical 
rules constrains government spending, it also decreases the amount of capital available 
for public investment in the EU countries. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews the related literature on the 
determinants of investment. Section three describes the analytical and econometric 
methodology. Section four presents the data and discusses our main results. Section five 
concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The theoretical literature on private investment is quite rich and diverse.4 Moreover, there 
is a large literature on the determinants of private investment in both developed5 and 
developing6 countries and two explanations for this interest can be put forward. First, most 
empirical studies have found positive, significant and robust effect of increases in investment 
ratio on economic growth (see Figure 1 for a stylised illustration).7 Indeed, Levine and Renelt 
(1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sturm and De Haan (2000) found that the ratio of total 
investment to GDP is among a few variables that are robustly correlated with growth for a 
diverse group of countries. This raises the question as of why the investment ratios across 
countries differ so much. Second, debt crises in the early 1990s triggered the interest in the 
“debt overhang” hypothesis. In general, those studies have found support for the adverse 
effects of the debts service and debt overhang on private investment.8 
 
_____________________________ 
4 The accumulation of real fixed capital stock and capital formation by the private sector has been prominent in 
formal models based on the experience of developed countries. The major strands of investment behaviour could 
be classified as the simple accelerator theory, the liquidity theory, expected profits theory, Tobin’s Q theory, and 
neoclassical theory. For a detailed review of the theoretical literature on investment see Jorgenson (1971) and 
Clark (1979). 
5 Empirical tests of the neoclassical accelerator theory (Jorgenson, 1967) using data from several advanced 
economies have been widely applied (Jorgenson, 1971 and Bischoff, 1971). 
6 Studies conducted for Africa, Asia and Latin America have also established the critical linkage between 
investment and growth. See, Hernandez-Cata, 2000; Ndikumana, 2000; Ben-David, 1998; Chari et al., 1997; 
Barro and Lee, 1994; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Barro, 1995; Ghura and Hadjimichael, 1996; Khan and 
Reinhart, 1990; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985.  
7 See, e.g., Ghura (1995), Savvides (1995), De Gregorio (1991), Barro (1991), Khan and Kumar (1993) and 
Khan and Reinhart (1990). 
8 See, e.g., Solimano (1989), Borensztein (1990), Green and Villanueva (1991), Ozler and Rodrik (1992), 
Cardoso (1993), Larrain and Vergara (1993), Serven and Solimano (1993), Sakr (1993) and Oshikoya (1994). 
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: This Figure shows a scatter between the growth rates of GDP per capita against private investment (% GDP). There seems to be a 
positive relationship between both types of investment and per capita GDP growth. For the OECD sub-group the positive relationship is 
stronger (not shown). 
 
When it comes to public investment one would expect it to boost growth. However, on the 
one hand, higher public investment raises the national rate of capital accumulation above the 
level chosen (in a presumed rational fashion) by private sector agents. Therefore, public 
capital spending may crowd-out private expenditures on capital goods on an ex-ante basis as 
individuals seek to re-establish an optimal inter-temporal allocation of resources.9 On the 
other hand, public capital – particularly infrastructure capital as highways, water systems, 
sewers and airports – is likely to bear a complementary relationship with private capital in the 
private production technology.10 Thus, higher public investment may raise the marginal 
productivity of private capital and thereby crowd-in private investment and positively affect 
output growth in net terms (see Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009). In Devarajan et al. (1996) 
(using a sample of developing countries) and Afonso and Furceri (2010) (for advanced 
countries) government investment has a sizeable negative and statistically significant effect 
on growth.11 
Only a handful of studies analyse the determinants of public investment. Except for De 
Haan et al. (1996) and Sturm (1998) who focus on political-economic factors affecting public 
investment, estimating a range of model specifications for 22 OECD countries between 1980-
9212 and, more recently, the European Commission (2003) and Turrini (2004) for the EU,13 
_____________________________ 
9 As there is a finite limit for domestic savings, public investment can in some cases pose a severe constraint for 
private investment and would crowd out private investment (Balassa, 1988). 
10 Empirical studies (Bljer and Khan, 1984; Greene and Villanueva, 1991) on 23 countries have shown that 
public investment in physical infrastructure is complementary to private investment. 
11 Prichett (1996) suggests the so-called “white-elephant” hypothesis in which public investment in developing 
countries is often used for unproductive and inappropriate projects. 
12 They conclude that episodes of “fiscal stringency” and frequent changes of government are associated with 
lower public investment and that movements in the latter then to follow private investment. 
13 They find that public investment (as percentage of GDP) tends to decline with GDP, with an improvement in 
the cyclically adjusted budget balance and with increasing public debt. 
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there are, to the best of our knowledge, no panel studies explaining government capital 
spending. More recently, Gali and Perotti (2003) focus on whether the EMU has changed the 
cyclical behaviour of public investment. They find it to be only “mildly pro-cyclical”.  
Finally, the empirical literature on the determinants of investment behaviour is roughly 
divided in two strands. On the one hand, cross-section/time series analyses for one or several 
countries: Loungani and Rush (1995), Blomstrom et al. (1996), Everhart and Sumlinski 
(2001), Campos and Nugent (2003) and Krishna et al. (2003) are the main references. On the 
other hand, microeconometric studies using firm level data: see, e.g., Chirinko and Schaller 
(1995), Bloom et al. (2001) and Butzen et al. (2002). 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Analytical framework 
In order to assess the impact of different budgetary sub-components on private and public 
investment, we estimate two specifications: 
 0 0 11: it i it it t i itI privinv y Z Fα β β γ η ν ε= + + + + + +   (1) 
 0 0 12 : it i it it t i itI pubinv y Z Fα β β γ η ν ε= + + + + + +   (2) 
where pubinvpriinv, represent the levels of private and public investment, respectively, and 
0iy is the initial value of the real GDP per capita. itZ  is a vector of control variables; itF  is a 
vector of budgetary component(s) of interest, either from the expenditure or revenue side); iν , 
tη correspond to the country-specific fixed effect and time-fixed effect, respectively. Finally, 
itε  is a column vector of some unobserved zero mean white noise-type satisfying the standard 
assumptions. γββα ,,, 10  are unknown parameter vectors to be estimated. itZ
1  includes 
labour force participation rate, and population growth. Implicit and contingent liabilities 
represent other factors related to public expenditures (or the need to collect more revenue), 
but not taken into account so far. For the ageing-related burden, we account for it using the 
age dependency-ratio, measured as a share of the working age population, depratio_wa, as an 
explanatory variable in (1) and (2). 
 
3.2. Econometric approaches 
Model Selection 
It is well known that the inclusion of particular control variables in a given regression can 
wipe out (or change the signs of) any bivariate relationship (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) and it 
 7
is necessary to consider which information to include in such regressions as control variables. 
Therefore, we deal with model uncertainty on the determinants of private and public 
investment, prior to conducting the main econometric analysis.  
We employ the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach. Essentially BMA treats 
parameters and models as random variables and attempts to summarise the uncertainty about 
the model in terms of a probability distribution over the space of possible models. More 
specifically, the method is used to average the posterior distribution for the parameters under 
all possible models, where the weights are the posterior model probabilities. To evaluate the 
posterior model probability the BMA uses the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) to 
approximate the Bayes factors that are needed to compute the posterior model probability, as 
discussed in more detail in Raftery (1995), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and Malik and Temple 
(2009). In the empirical section, the output of the BMA analysis includes the posterior 
inclusion probabilities for variables and a sign certainty index.14 The higher the posterior 




Cross-country regressions are usually based, in this context, on average values of fiscal 
and investment variables over long time periods. Drawbacks, problems and inefficiencies due 
to the discarding of information on within-country variation have been extensively discussed.  
Resorting to panel data can overcome (some of) these problems, and has other advantages. 
We focus mainly on combined cross-section time-series regressions using cumulative 5-year 
non-overlapping averages to smooth the effects of short-run fluctuations. We run within 
fixed-effects as a benchmark model (for completeness) despite being aware of the 
econometric IV-related problems. We include time dummies which is consistent with 
(underlying) common technical progress.  
 
Bias and endogeneity  
 Panel data estimations may yield biased coefficient estimates when lagged dependent 
variables are included. Therefore, we also estimate our regressions using the bias-corrected 
least-squares dummy variable (LSDV-C) estimator by Bruno (2005).  
_____________________________ 
14 For posterior inclusion probabilities greater than 0.50, a sign certainty index rather than sign certainty 
probability is presented, clearly suggesting the relationship being either positive or negative. 
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Moreover, we use a panel Instrumental Variable-Generalised Least Squares (IV-GLS) 
approach, which is then complemented by estimating the main equations using Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM), which can be viewed as a step-by-step approach, First by 
writing down a static model, and then by reformulating it as a dynamic model (partial 
adjustment model in the case of the convergence regression with initial per capita GDP or the 
lagged level depending on the dataset). The first-differenced GMM estimate can be poorly 
behaved if the time series are persistent. This problem can get very serious in practice and 
authors like Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) suggest the use of a more efficient GMM 
estimator, the system estimator, to exploit stationary restrictions.  
Hence, we estimate the investment equation by system-GMM15 (SYS-GMM) which 
jointly estimates the equations in first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the 
dependent and independent variables, and in levels, using as instruments the first differences 
of the regressors. As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as 
instruments in the difference (level) equation, as work by Roodman (2009) has indicated, 
when it comes to moment conditions more is not always better. The GMM estimators are 
likely to suffer from “overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or 
exceeds) the number of groups/countries. In the present case, the choice of lags was directed 
by checking the validity of different sets of instruments and we rely on comparisons of first 
stage R-squares; alternatively. Intuitively, the system GMM estimator does not rely 
exclusively on the first-differenced equations, but exploits also information contained in the 
original equations in levels. 
 
Panel Granger causality 
We also perform a panel version of a Granger-causality test between private (and public) 
investment and real per capita GDP, similarly to Huang and Temple (2005).16  
Since causality can run in either direction, we cannot treat say real per capita GDP as 
strictly exogenous. Alternatively, we run partial adjustment specifications which allow 
feedback by means of sequential moment conditions to identify the model (see Arellano, 
2003). The standard approach in the literature would be to specify an AR(1) model as follows: 
_____________________________ 
15 The GMM aproach estimates parameters directly from moment conditions imposed by the model. To enable 
identification the number of moment conditions should be at least as large as the number of unknown 
parameters. Moreover, the mechanics of the GMM approach relates to a standard instrumental variable estimator 
and also to issues such as instrumental validity and informativeness. 









++++= −− φηβα , (3)  
where in our case ity  is either private or public investment (deflated and in per capita terms) 
and itx  will real per capita GDP. The reverse relationship is also explored for the whole 
sample and OECD sub-sample. 
The model in (3) allows for unobserved heterogeneity through the individual effect iη  
that captures the joint effect of time-invariant omitted variables. tφ  is a common time effect, 
while itv  is the disturbance term. We also assume that itx  is potentially correlated with iη and 
may be correlated with itv , but is uncorrelated with future shocks ,..., 21 ++ itit vv  Under these 
assumptions, 1−tx  is predetermined with respect to itv  and the errors can be assumed to satisfy 
sequential moment conditions of the form: 0),,,|( 11 =−− tititiit xyvE φη , where )',...,,( 1211 −− = itiiti yyyy  
and )',...,,( 1211 −− = itiiti xxxx . When these moment conditions are satisfied, the errors are 
conditionally serially uncorrelated and this implies that 0),( =− jitit vvE .The model can be 
estimated by first-differencing (3) to get rid of the individual effects, and then using lagged 
levels of ity  and itx  dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments. However, a more efficient GMM 
estimator can be employed by using more of the available moment conditions, as suggested 
by Arellano and Bond (1991), who proposed the use of all available lagged levels of ity  and 
itx  dated t-2 (and earlier). We name this estimator DIF-GMM. In this context, we also use 
Hansen J's test to assess the model specification and overidentifying restrictions. 
As there are a number of limitations of DIF-GMM estimation17, under the assumptions 
set in Arellano and Bover (1995), the system-GMM estimator can be used to alleviate the 
weak instruments problem. In our setting, the SYS-GMM uses the standard moment 
conditions, while SYS-GMM1 (modified 1) only uses the lagged first-differences of ity  dated 
t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels and SYS-GMM2 (modified 2) only uses lagged first-
differences of itx  dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels. 
    In the AR(1) model, one hypothesis of economic interest is the null 01 =β – this can be 
interpreted as a panel data test for Granger causality. Even though a Wald-type test of this 
restriction (a standard t-ratio) could be used, we make use of an alternative methodology. 
_____________________________ 
17 For instance, the lagged levels of the series may be weak instruments for first differences, especially when 
they  are highly persistent, or the variance of the individual effects is high relative to the variance of the transient 
shocks 
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Specifically, we estimate both the unrestricted and the restricted models using the same 
moment conditions, and then compare their (two-step) Hansen J statistics using an 
incremental Hansen test defined as: 
 ))()~(( γγ )JJnDRU −=  (4)  
where )~(γJ is the minimized GMM criterion for the restricted model, )(γ)J  for the unrestricted 
model, and n is the number of observations. Under the null, RUD  is asymptotically distributed 
as 2rχ where r is the number of restrictions. The intuition is that, if the parameter restriction 
( 01 =β ) is valid, the moment conditions should keep their validity even in the restricted 
model.18 
    There are some additional issues of interpretation worth discussing in the context of the use 
of the above model. One may be interested in the stability of the estimated model. If our 
model is stable, we can compute a point estimate for the long-run effect of itx  on ity : 
 )1/( 11 αββ −=LR , (5)  




We are aware of the potential issue (in particular, bias in coefficient estimates) induced by 
a significant cross-sectional dependence (within similar groups of countries in our sample) in 
the error term of the model. As put forward by Eberhardt et al. (2010), the so-called 
unobserved common factor technique relies on both latent factors in the error term and 
regressors to take into account the existence of cross-sectional dependence. Developed with 
the panel-date/time-series econometric literature over the course of the past few years, this 
method has been largely employed in macroeconomic panel data exercises (see, e.g., Pesaran 
(2004, 2006), Coakley et al. (2006), Pesaran and Tosetti (2007), Bai (2009), Kapetanios et al. 
(2009) and Eberhardt and Teal (2011 and references therein)). This common factor 
methodology takes cross-sectional dependence as the outcome of unobserved time-varying 
omitted common variables or shocks which influence each cross-sectional element in a 
different way. Cross-sectional dependence in the error term of the estimated model results 
_____________________________ 
18 For more details see Bond and Windmeijer (2005). 
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then in inconsistent coefficient estimates if independent variables are correlated with the 
unspecified common variables or shocks.19 
With this in mind, we test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence Pesaran’s (2004) 
CD test statistic based on a standard normal distribution. We then run some of the most 
important regression equations with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. This non-
parametric technique assumes the error structure to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to 
some lag and possibly correlated between the groups. Given the particular nature of the 
dependent variable and the possibility of error dependence another estimation approach would 
be worthwhile. We rely on the Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) 
estimator, a generalization of the fixed effects estimator that allows for the possibility of cross 
section correlation. Including the (weighted) cross sectional averages of the dependent 
variable and individual specific regressors is suggested by Pesaran (2006, 2007, and 2009) as 
an effective way to filter out the impacts of common factors, which could be common 
technological shocks or macroeconomic shocks, causing between group error dependence. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
The dataset was collected from several sources for 95 countries for the period 1970-
2008.20 Our main dependent variables are: 1) private investment and 2) public investment 
(both as shares of GDP). 
Fiscal variables come from the WDI, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
and Easterly’s (2001) data. They comprise the budget balance (% GDP) and the Central 
Government Debt (% GDP) – the latter retrieved from the IMF’s historical debt database due 
to Abas et al. (2010). On the government revenue side we have, as % of GDP: Total 
Government Revenue, Tax Revenue, Taxes on Goods and Services, Taxes on Payroll or work 
force, Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains, Taxes on Property, and Social 
Contributions. On the government expenditure side we consider, as a % of GDP: Total 
Government Expenditure, Compensation of Employees, Interest Payments, Subsidies, Public 
Final Consumption Expenditure, and a functional decomposition comprising of Spending on 
Education, Spending on Health, and Spending on Social Security and Welfare. 
With respect to human capital proxies we mainly rely on the average years of schooling in 
the population over 25 years old from the international data on educational attainment by 
_____________________________ 
19 There are different ways to account for such error cross-sectional dependences (see, e.g., Sarafidis and 
Wansbeek (2010) for an overview). 
20 A summary with definitions, acronyms and sources is presented in the Appendix. 
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Barro and Lee (2010), but we also take, for robustness, the literacy rate (% of people aged 15 
to 24), primary school enrolment (% of gross), primary school duration (years), secondary 
school enrolment (% gross), secondary school duration (years), tertiary school enrolment (% 
gross) and tertiary school duration (years) from the WDI, for robustness purposes. 
As for other controls and regressors, most come from either the WDI or from the IMF’s 
IFS, as follows: land area (in square kilometres), population, imports and exports of goods 
and services (BoP, current USD), labour participation rate (% of total labour force), labour 
force, unemployment, (% of total labour force), fertility rate (births per woman), age 
dependency ratio (% of working age population), urban population (% of total), terms of trade 
adjustment (constant LCU), real effective exchange rate index (2000=100). 
 
 
4.1. Model selection  
One reason for the strong appeal of the BMA is that the weights in the final averaging 
procedure are tied quite closely to the predictive ability of the different models. Vis-à-vis the 
Extreme Bounds Analysis, in the BMA there is no set of fixed variables included and the 
number of explanatory variables in the specifications is flexible. In Table 1a we have the 
results from our BMA application where the dependent variable is the level of private 
investment (GFCF) over GDP. The BMA yields posterior probabilities of inclusion (PIP) and 
a sign certainty index of a relationship.21 We present 10 different possible models containing 
different sets of regressors grouped by type: scale/size, living conditions, policy/institutional, 
education and, finally, government. 
[Table 1a] 
A first result is that the initial level of per capita GDP should be included and it has in 
several cases the expected negative (and significant) sign, translating the conditional beta-type 
convergence hypothesis. Moreover, size, proxied notably by land area is detrimental to 
private investment. Other interesting results are the fact that fertility rates, age dependency 
ratio and unemployment (proxying living conditions and state of development) have a 
negative effect on private investment. Policy variables such as openness to international trade 
have a positive impact on private investment, and the same is true with institutional measures 
such as the Freedom House index and the Corruption Perception Index. Furthermore, there is 
a positive impact of human capital. With respect to government-related variables the main 
findings are: i) (some) taxes seem to have a positive effect on private investment, ii) a positive 
_____________________________ 
21 A sign is given to the PIPs greater than 0.5; no sign means the sign of the estimated relationship is uncertain. 
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effect attributed to both total government expenditures as well as public investment in 
fostering private investment, iii) a negative effect of both government expenditure on wages 
and government consumption spending on private investment.  
[Table 1b] 
With respect to public investment (see Table 1b), results are less clear-cut but we find 
unemployment affecting it adversely and so does education. Revenues present mixed 
evidence (naturally depending on whether taxes will be spent on productive or unproductive 
activities). Higher government expenditure on health is associated with larger public 
investment. 
Finally, in Table 2 for both dependent variables previously discussed we report the top 
models based on their R-squares. All in all, the best models include expenditure components 
and signal the relatively less important impact attributed to government revenues’ categories. 
[Table 2] 
 
4.2. Budgetary economic (de-)composition 
Table 3 presents the results for our two benchmark equations (1) and (2) using fixed-
effects and system-GMM approaches.22 Population growth has a positive impact on both 
types on investment, whereas, in general, initial GDP per capita hampers investment 
(similarly as in the case of the catching-up hypothesis within the empirical growth literature). 
Evidence seems to suggest that age structure of a country also affects investment. For private 
investment a higher dependency ratio has a negative impact, whereas for public investment 
the effect is reversed. In the former case, if a high proportion of the population is of working 
age then the economy should have a high rate of private saving and investment would flourish 
(Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis). Higher proportions of the young and elderly in relation 
to persons of working age are associated with lower saving rates and investment (Siddiqui and 
Siddiqui, 1993; Khan et al., 1992). Yet another explanation for the negative sign comes from 
the fact that this may reflect the tendency for scarce or costly prime-age labour to depress the 
returns on private investment and make it less attractive. Decreasing labour supply reduces 
the demand for investment goods insofar as there is less labour for capital to cooperate with. 
Additionally, some forms of investment may be rendered less attractive by the 
diminishing returns to scale associated with a smaller or more slowly growing population. In 
the latter case - the positive sign in the case of public investment - a higher dependency-ratio 
_____________________________ 
22 IV-GLS estimation does not alter the results. 
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exerts a positive influence on the government spending share in general, primarily through 
human capital widening demands (by requiring larger budget and public investment to 
educate the large number of school age children) and by increasing the expenditures for the 
social security and medical care (and associated public investment in hospitals and related 
healthcare facilities, Kelley, 1976).23  
[Table 3] 
Given our benchmark equations (1)-(2) together with their respective set of controls, we 
now move to the inclusion of different sub-components of government revenues and 
expenditures. In Table 4 we include each item, one at a time, in a regression of interest, for 
private and public investment. 
[Table 4] 
Inspecting first the revenues’ panel we observe that each component does not significantly 
affect private or public investment in OECD countries. However, taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains as well as social security contributions have a statistically significant positive 
impact on public investment for the full sample and emerging economies sub-group, but not 
for the OECD. This may seem counterintuitive, but Helms (1985) and Mofidi and Stone 
(1990) found that taxes spent on publicly provided productive inputs tend to (ultimately) 
enhance growth via appropriate investment spending.24  
Turning to the expenditures’ panel, interest payments and subsidies have a negative effect 
on both types of investment (particularly in the emerging economies sub-group), the latter 
eventually due to the fact that it creates deadweight loss inefficiencies when distorting the 
market from its own natural equilibrium. On the other hand, higher public interest payments 
imply an additional burden on the public purse, making it more difficult to finance public 
investment. For private investment, financing conditions may also become stricter due to 
possible spillover effects, from higher sovereign yields into, the funding of private 
investment.  
A natural step to take further is to include all components of each budgetary block 
simultaneously in equations (1)-(2). Table 5a reports the results for the revenue block. 
Domestic taxes on goods and services appear now with a statistically significant negative 
coefficient in the private investment regression (specification 3). For taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains, the positive significance is kept. As regards the OECD sub-group, revenue 
_____________________________ 
23 For robustness Appendix B presents the results from Bruno’s (2005) LSDV-C estimator. Results are consistent 
with previous findings. 
24 Theoretically, in Barro-style models, increases in taxes can enhance, have no effect or impede growth 
depending, in particular, on the initial level of taxes as well as how revenues are spent. 
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variables are never significant in private investment equations. In general, revenues keep their 
positive signs and statistical significance when explaining the level of public investment (a 
relationship coming from the possibility of an increased inflow of available funds to spend). 
Taking account of endogeneity problems (with a corresponding panel IV-GLS approach – not 
shown) increases the significance level in most coefficients, in particular the basic set of 
controls (positive effect of population growth in I1 and I2), the overall negative effect of taxes 
on private investment, but their positive effect on public investment. Most revenues’ 
coefficients for the OECD sub-group remain insignificant. Alternatively, running system-
GMM for the full sample (specifications 7-8) removes any statistically significance out of the 
revenue’s categories, confirming Easterly and Rebelo’s (1993) claim that taxes are difficulty 
to isolate empirically. 
[Table 5a] 
Regarding the expenditure items in Table 5b, on average, the R-squares are somewhat 
higher than when disaggregated revenues are included in the regressions (particularly for the 
OECD sub-group). Overall, evidence suggests a higher importance attributed to government 
expenditures than to revenues. Apart from expected signs on the basic set of controls as 
already discussed, a closer inspection indicates that interest payments is detrimental in both 
investment equations (when running both FE and SYS-GMM). On the other hand, subsidies 
appear with positive and statistically significant coefficients in private investment (OECD) 
and in public investment (emerging economies) equations. As with the case of government 
revenues, when endogeneity is taken into account, most coefficients increase their 
significance levels with “right” sign estimates. Moreover, R-squares increase from FE to IV-
GLS estimation in every specification. 
 [Table 5b] 
 
4.3. Decomposition of functional spending 
Government spending can play an essential role in the economic development of a 
country by maintaining law and order, providing economic infrastructure, harmonizing 
conflicts between private and social interests, increasing labour productivity through 
education and health and enhancing export industries. Hence, in terms of the functional 
decomposition of government expenditures, we differentiate the effects from spending on 
education, health, and social security (and welfare), which constitute the main items of 
government spending.  
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In Table 6, Panel A, each of the abovementioned spending categories is included in the 
regression for private investment one at a time. For reasons of parsimony we do not report the 
full set of coefficient estimates. Regarding social security spending, it has a statistically 
negative effect on private investment for the full and OECD samples.25 Concerning 
government health spending it appears with a positive and significant coefficient for private 
investment, which is positively correlated with population growth and by itself has a positive 
impact on investment levels. In Panel B, the three variables of interest are included 
simultaneously in each regression and, in general, the same conclusions apply. 
[Table 6] 
 
4.4. Non-linearities in budgetary decomposition 
The presence of large government debt burdens constitutes a source of uncertainty in the 
macroeconomic environment. Government debt may affect private investment in several 
ways. First, the size and timing of external transfers to the country’s creditors may be 
uncertain as it depends on future levels of the world interest rates, terms of trade, the 
purchasing power of exports and the ability to reschedule debt. Thus, the level of the real 
exchange rate and the timing of demand management policies consistent with the required 
transfer also become uncertain (Borenzstein, 1989). Second, funds available for investment 
will be reduced where a higher debt service payment is involved. Third, many developing 
countries face liquidity constraints in international capital markets because of large arrears on 
debt service obligations (Krugman, 1988; Corden, 1988). Finally, several studies have 
emphasized that a heavy debt overhang reduces the incentive to invest because the anticipated 
foreign tax on future income and returns on investment (Serven and Solimano, 1991; Greene 
and Villanueva, 1991). A high debt-to-GDP ratio means that part of future returns on any 
investment must be used to service the existing stock of debt. Empirical results have 
confirmed that high debt-to-GDP ratio has a strong negative impact on the private investment 
rates in developing countries (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
Hence, an additional exercise is to further explore possible effects coming from non-
linearities in the context of the budgetary decomposition we have been discussing. One may 
be inclined to think that the reduction of budget deficits (or government debt) can be 
conducive to higher growth via increased investment (at least private one, through a reduced 
probability of – implicit - crowding-out effects). Of interest is whether our results hold for all 
_____________________________ 
25 Looking at GDP growth instead, Landau (1983, 1986), Barro (1991) and Grier and Tullock (1989) found a 
negative relationship between social expenditures and growth. 
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countries in the sample, in particular, for countries that have already achieved a modicum of 
macroeconomic (fiscal) stability.26 Therefore, we split the sample into countries so-called 
“above” or “below”, based on a given fiscal threshold. Specifically, an “above” type country 
is defined as a country that maintained on average (over time) a budget deficit below 3% of 
GDP; conversely, a “below” type country is such that it maintained an average budget deficit 
above 3% of GDP.27 We also repeat the procedure with a 60% of GDP government debt 
threshold (that is, the “above” type country is one that maintained an average debt ratio below 
60% of GDP over the period; mutatis mutandis for the “below” case).28 Figure 2 summarizes 
such split. One does not see much difference when looking at private investment, but the 
same does not apply to public investment which is always somewhat lower in countries with 
higher (deficit or debt). This may indicate when facing relevant fiscal imbalances the 
government more quickly reduces capital spending. 
 
Figure 2: Bar-chart of private and public investment performance as a function of the full 
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Private and Public Investment Performance
(full sample)
 
Note: “<3% deficit” denotes the cross-sectional average of private and public investment as percentage of GDP 
for the set of countries which maintained a budget deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3% over the full time span 
considered – “above” type countries. Mutatis mutandis for “>3% deficit”. “<60% debt” denotes the cross-
sectional average of private and public investment as percentage of GDP for the set of countries which 
_____________________________ 
26 On the same line, see Adam and Bevan (2001) and Gupta et al. (2005). 
27 The 3% value is an ad-hoc number stemming from the European Union Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
rationale. For the OECD sub-group, countries classified as being “above” average, lower budget deficits, are: 
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakiam Spain, Switzerland, UK and US. The “below” average 
ones, higher deficits, are: Austria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey. 
28 The 60% limit for the debt ratio is related to the SGP framework, although also endogenously computed in 
Afonso and Jalles (2011b), above which government debt is detrimental to growth – see further details therein. 
According to this threshold for the OECD sub-group, countries classified as “above” average, lower debt ratio, 
are: Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US. The 
“below” average ones, higher debt ratio, are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and 
Portugal. 
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maintained  a total government debt-to-GDP ratio below 60% over the full time span considered – “above” type 
countries. Mutatis mutandis for “>60% debt”. Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Below we report the results with the 3% deficit threshold. We do not include debt 
explicitly in our econometric specification (as in Chirinko and Schaller, 1995) since its impact 
on investment decisions, though important, may be a priori unpredictable. Needless to say that 
some of these results require care in interpretation given the truncated nature of the resulting 
sample and reduced number of available observations. Using as the dependent variable 
private investment yields, generally, insignificant coefficients for both revenues’ and 
expenditures’ components, so we refrain from presenting and commenting on this set of 
results. Focusing on the public investment regression instead, we get from Table 7 that 
countries which maintained an average public deficit above 3% of GDP are negatively 
affected by interest payments, subsidies and government consumption expenditure 
(statistically significant at 5 and 1% levels). This compares with insignificant expenditure 
components’ coefficient estimates for the case of below the 3% of GDP average deficit level. 
[Table 7] 
As described above, for robustness, we also used a 60% threshold for the average public 
debt-to-GDP ratio over a country’s time series span. For reasons of parsimony results are 
available upon request. Overall, we get mixed evidence from revenues’ components 
coefficient estimates. As for the expenditures’ components, interest payments and government 
final consumption appear with statistically significant negative signs for debt above 60% of 
GDP. Redoing these estimations with the truncated set of basic regressors or using the 5-year 
average period debt-rule instead of the country average, doesn’t alter the main results (not 
shown). 
 
4.5. Panel Granger-causality tests 
It also seems important to understand whether expenditures (revenues) Granger cause per 
capita private investment or even if GDP per capita Granger causes either private or public 
investment (or the reverse applies or even if one finds two-way causality). First, we don’t find 
evidence of causality running from either real total government expenditures per capita or real 
total government revenues per capita to real private investment per capita.29 If we test the 
GDP-investment relationship, in Table 8a we get some evidence of causality from real GDP 
per capita to real Private Investment per capita.  
_____________________________ 
29 Both private and public investment(% of GDP) as well as total government expenditures and revenues were 
converted to nominal levels, deflated using the CPI and scaled by population. 
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[Table 8a] 
Out of 6 econometric specifications, 2 support Granger causality, with both models (1) 
and (2) indicating a positive short and long-run effect of GDP on private investment. The 
reverse relationship also holds and it is actually slightly stronger, with models (4)-(6) in Table 
8b pointing to causality running from private investment to GDP. Since results using public 
investment instead are uninteresting (with short and long-run insignificant coefficient 
estimates and non-rejection of the null of non-Granger causality) we refrain from presenting 
and commenting on this set of results. 
If we try to uncover causality running from public to private investment, we obtain 
statistically insignificant results irrespectively of the econometric specification. 
 
4.6. Cross-sectional dependence 
As discussed in Section 3 it is natural to suspect about the existence of cross-sectional 
dependence across homogeneous groups of economies. Therefore, we use Pesaran’s CD test30 
for the OECD sub-samples and we find a statistic of 12.05, corresponding to a p-value of zero 
(the null hypothesis is cross-sectional independence). In Table 9 we run benchmark type 
investment regressions for this OECD sample using both a Driscoll Kraay robust estimation 
approach and the Pesaran’s Common Correlated Effects Pooled Estimator (CCEP). We 
restrict ourselves to the examination of four main variables of interest: total government 
expenditures and revenues (% of GDP) and their respective growth rates.  
[Table 9] 
Evidence in Table 9 suggests that government revenues have a detrimental effect on 
private investment; the reverse is true for public investment. However, revenues’ and 
expenditures’ growth rates have a positive effect on private investment and none on public 
investment.  
 
4.7. Numerical Fiscal Rules 
In the context of the EU, Member States face a fiscal framework based on the 
implementation of sound fiscal policies, notably within the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
guidelines put forward in 1997. In fact, self-enforced institutional restrictions to budgetary 
decision-making are a common feature of fiscal governance in advanced countries (see 
Hallerberg et al., 2007 for an overview). In addition to excess spending in the absence of such 
_____________________________ 
30 A standard investment equation including a basic set of controls and the debt ratio is estimated with within 
fixed effects. 
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rules, previous literature also suggests that the so-called “common pool problem” may induce 
a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy (Tornell and Lane, 1999). Yet another rational for the 
implementation of such numerical rules is to prevent policymakers from exacerbating 
macroeconomic volatility which is known to be detrimental to output growth. However, the 
Member States’ track records of complying with the fiscal rules laid down in the SGP have 
been mixed.31 Therefore, it is relevant to assess whether such numerical fiscal rules, while 
aiming at improving fiscal positions, also play a role in fostering (public) investment. To our 
best knowledge such an empirical exercise has never been conducted.  
Therefore, we use the three indices constructed by the European Commission (overall rule 
index, expenditure rule index, and budget balance and debt rule index).32 Table 10 reports our 
findings between 1990-2008 using fixed-effects. 
[Table 10] 
Based on equation (2), we find on specifications (1)-(3) statistically significant negative 
coefficients on the overall rule index and the budget balance rule index, meaning that having 
strong fiscal numerical rules, notably by promoting sounder fiscal behaviour, also decreases 
the amount of capital available for public investment for these set of EU countries.  
Finally, we also tested specifications in which our sample is split based on the country-
average debt-to-GDP ratio over the entire time period being higher or lower than 60% (in line 
with the SGP threshold level). Specifications (4)-(6) redo the exercise for countries with debt 
level below 60% over the period and we get insignificant coefficient estimates for all three 
fiscal rules (despite keeping their negative sign). In contrast, countries that maintained an 
average public debt over 60% get a slightly stronger (in magnitude) overall rule index (and 
identical magnitude and statistical significance for the budget balance rule index). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have used cross-sectional/time series data for a panel of 95 developed and developing 
countries for the period 1970-2008, in order to assess the potential linkage between fiscal 
policy developments and investment. More specifically, we focused on a number of 
econometric issues that could have an important bearing on the results, notably simultaneity, 
_____________________________ 
31 The European Commission (2006) points to significant heterogeneity of national fiscal frameworks within the 
EU and suggests that “stronger” fiscal rules are conducive to sound public finances (and ultimately more 
efficient and growth-enhancing economic policies). 
32 These indices are normalized to have a zero mean and unit variance. They are based on a survey conducted by 
the Working Group on the Quality of Public Finances among practitioners and researchers in the field of fiscal 
policy. These measures bear strong appeal for empirical implementations as they translate a broad set of 
institutional provisions into a country-specific cardinal ranking (see Deburn at al., 2008, and Afonso and 
Hauptmeier, 2009 for details). 
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endogeneity, (two-way) causality, the relevance of nonlinearities and threshold effects, cross-
section dependence and numerical fiscal rules. Our results coming out of the Model Selection-
based techniques suggest a positive effect attributed to both total government expenditures as 
well as public investment in fostering private investment and negative effects of both 
government expenditure on wages and government consumption spending on private 
investment. With respect to public investment, revenues present mixed evidence (naturally 
depending on whether taxes will be spent on productive or unproductive activities), but higher 
government expenditure on health is associated with larger public investment.   
Our evidence also suggests that population growth has a positive impact on both types on 
investment, whereas, in general, initial GDP per capita hampers investment. More 
importantly, evidence seems to suggest that age structure of a country also affects investment: 
for private investment a higher dependency ratio has a negative impact, whereas for public 
investment the effect is reversed. If we decompose revenues, we observe that each component 
(when introduced individually) does not significantly affect private or public investment in 
OECD countries. However, taxes on income, profits and capital gains as well as social 
security contributions have a statistically significant positive impact on public investment for 
the full sample and emerging economies sub-group, but not for the OECD. As for 
expenditures, interest payments and subsidies have a negative effect on both types of 
investment (particularly in the emerging economies sub-group). Regarding the functional 
classification of government spending, social security spending has a statistically negative 
effect on private investment for the full and OECD samples, whereas government health 
spending it appears with a positive and significant coefficient for private investment. 
Moreover, exploring non-linearities we see that public investment is always lower in 
countries with higher deficit/debt. Furthermore, countries which maintained average 
government budget deficits above 3% of GDP are, more strongly, negatively affected by 
interest payments, subsidies and government consumption expenditure.  Results are robust to 
several econometric procedures.  
Cross-sectional dependence regressions suggest that government revenues have a 
detrimental effect on private investment; the reverse is true for public investment. However, 
revenues’ and expenditures’ growth rates have a positive effect on private investment and 
none on public investment. 
Granger causality tests find evidence supporting causality running from GDP to private 
investment and the reverse appears to be stronger (with both positive short and long-run 
effects).  
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We also find statistically significant negative coefficients on the overall EU fiscal rule 
index and the budget balance rule index, meaning that having good fiscal numerical rules may 
decreases notably fiscal imbalances but also the amount of capital available for public 
investment for the EU countries. One can wonder whether the fiscal imbalance is then not 
first tackled by the governments via cuts in capital spending, which would in principle be 
more growth enhancing than current spending. 
 All in all, evidence suggests a higher importance attributed to government expenditures 
than to revenues in explaining either private or public investment levels. 
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 Table 1a: BMA-Determinants of Private Investment 
Variable PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign 
Spec. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
inigdp 0.14  0.99 + 0.90 - 0.98 - 0.93 + 0.00  0.00  0.89 + 0.27  
Scale/size                   
lfp 1.00 + 0.99 - 0.91 - 0.97 + 0.89 - 0.28  1.00 + 0.95 - 0.17  
land_area 1.00 - 0.99 - 0.96 - 0.65 - 0.11  0.99 - 1.00 - 0.35  1.00 - 
Living conditions                   
mortality 0.00                  
fertility 0.99 -                 
depratio_wa 1.00 -               0.00  
urban_pop 0.17                  
unemp 0.61 -                 
Policy/institutional                   
openness   0.97 +             0.14  
termstrade   0.64 +               
reer   0.43                
fhindex   0.99 +             1.00 + 
corrind   0.99 -             0.95 - 
Education                   
primary_enrol     0.11              
secondary_enrol     0.98 +           0.19  
tertiary_enrol     0.99 -             
literates     0.99 +             
Government                   
totgovrev_gdp       0.00          1.00 + 
domtaxesgs_gdp           0.00        
taxesincome_gdp           0.30        
taxproperty_gdp           0.18        
taxpayroll_gdp           1.00 +       
taxsscgovrev_gdp           1.00 +       
totgovexp_gdp         0.62 +         
govexpwages_gdp             1.00 +     
intpay_gdp             1.00 +     
subs_gdp             0.13      
govcons_gdp             0.74 -     
pubinv_gdp             0.00      
govexpedu_gdp               0.75 +   
govexphea_gdp               0.97 +   
govexpss_gdp               0.98 -   
R-squared 0.12  0.12  0.10  0.14  0.15  0.19  0.69  0.11  0.22  
Note: The dependent variable is Private Investment (% GDP) over the sample full period, 1970-2008. The variable description is in the main text. The BMA 
analysis yields the posterior probabilities of inclusion (PIPs) and the sign certainty index of a relationship. A sign is given to the PIPs greater than 0.5. No sign 




Table 1b: BMA-Determinants of Public Investment 
Variable PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign PIPs Sign 
Spec. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
inigdp 0.00  1.00 - 0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  
Scale/size                   
lfp 0.28  0.01  0.79 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 0.77 - 1.00 - 0.30  1.00 + 
land_area 0.74 + 1.00 + 0.93 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 0.99 - 1.00 - 0.99 - 1.00 + 
Living conditions                   
mortality 0.01                  
fertility 1.00 +                 
depratio_wa 1.00 +               0.00  
urban_pop 0.84 -                 
unemp 1.00 +                 
Policy/institutional                   
openness   1.00 -             0.47  
termstrade   1.00 -               
reer   0.09                
fhindex   0.00              0.00  
corrind   0.72 -             1.00 - 
Education                   
primary_enrol     0.92 -             
secondary_enrol     0.98 -           1.00 - 
tertiary_enrol     0.86 -             
literates     0.97 -             
Government                   
totgovrev_gdp       0.00          1.00 - 
domtaxesgs_gdp           1.00 -       
taxesincome_gdp           0.00        
taxproperty_gdp           1.00 -       
taxpayroll_gdp           1.00 +       
taxsscgovrev_gdp           0.01        
totgovexp_gdp         0.00          
govexpwages_gdp             0.99 +     
intpay_gdp                   
subs_gdp                   
govcons_gdp             0.02      
govexpedu_gdp               0.00    
govexphea_gdp               0.99 +   
govexpss_gdp               1.00 -   
R-squared 0.46  0.81  0.46  0.38  0.39  0.36  0.19  0.39  0.66  
Note: The dependent variable is Public Investment (% GDP) over the sample full period, 1970-2008. The variable description is in the main text. The BMA 
analysis yields the posterior probabilities of inclusion (PIPs) and the sign certainty index of a relationship. A sign is given to the PIPs greater than 0.5. No sign 
means the sign of estimated relationship being uncertain. 
 
Table 2: Top 5 BMA-type Models and their posterior probabilities 
Dependent variable Priinv Pubinv 
Regressors   
inigdppc * *, s 
laborf *, s * 
landarea *, s *, s 
openness  *, s 
termstrade  *, s 
reer  * 
fhindex  * 
corrind  *, s 
govexpwages_gdp *, s  
intpay_gdp *,s  
subs_gdp *,  
govcons_gdp *,s  
pubinv_gdp *  
R-squared 0.69 0.81 
 29
Note: This table presents the top models from Tables 1a-1b, ranked by their R-squares in the whole sample. The variable description is in the main text. * and s, 
denote inclusion of the variable in the BMA regression and whether it reported a statistically significant coefficient, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Benchmark cross-country investment equations, 5-year averages (including time period 




Private Investment Public Investment Private Investment Public Investment 
Estimation FE (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Equation I.1 I.2 I.1 I.2 
             
inigdppc -0.70 -
5.42*** 






 (0.959) (1.477) (1.579) (0.877) (0.853) (1.333) (0.611) (0.968) (2.227) (0.812) (1.794) (1.028) 
lfp 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.05 -0.22 0.09 -0.18 -0.23** 0.15 -0.15 
 (0.080) (0.102) (0.087) (0.072) (0.062) (0.168) (0.135) (0.144) (0.144) (0.099) (0.167) (0.098) 
popgr 1.27*** 2.34*** 1.64*** 0.41 0.75 -0.53 0.65 2.77*** 1.38** 0.02 -0.34 -0.66 
 (0.357) (0.733) (0.509) (0.295) (0.476) (0.941) (0.670) (1.071) (0.647) (0.325) (1.072) (1.051) 






0.10* -0.11 -0.08 
 (0.037) (0.065) (0.051) (0.035) (0.051) (0.047) (0.054) (0.079) (0.097) (0.056) (0.117) (0.127) 
             
Obs. 1,007 202 197 488 146 99 1,007 202 197 488 146 99 
R-squared 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.31       
Hansen (p-
value) 
      0.03 1.00 1.00 0.36 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-
value) 
      0.62 0.93 0.69 0.17 0.16 0.57 
AB AR(2) (p-
value) 
      0.08 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.35 0.42 
Note: The models are estimated by either Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) or Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is either private investment or public investment,. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term 




Table 4: Investment equations with Budgetary Economic Decomposition when fiscal variables are 
introduced one at a time in the benchmark equations, 5-year averages 




Estimation Fixed Effects (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD All All OECD Emerg All 
Spec. 1 2 7 8 5 6 7 8 
Equation I.1 I.2 I.1 I.2 
Revenue Variables         
taxrev_gdp 0.28 0.24 1.09*** 0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.47 0.03 
 (0.238) (0.186) (0.260) (0.287) (0.098) (0.286) (0.352) (0.333) 
domtaxesgs_gdp -0.10 -0.21 -0.23 0.01 0.04 -0.27 -0.15 -0.12 
 (0.265) (0.344) (0.393) (0.239) (0.186) (0.298) (0.570) (0.368) 
taxesincome_gdp 0.21* -0.03 0.26 0.42*** 0.11 0.35** 0.56** 0.41* 
 (0.120) (0.109) (0.350) (0.092) (0.084) (0.147) (0.253) (0.241) 
taxproperty_gdp 1.32 0.23 0.49 0.24 -0.47 0.85 0.34 0.47 
 (0.936) (0.622) (2.691) (0.613) (0.422) (1.197) (1.352) (2.189) 
taxpayroll_gdp 0.36 1.06 -9.30* 0.64 -0.29 0.75 1.91 0.96 
 (1.317) (0.899) (4.687) (0.673) (0.417) (1.398) (1.281) (2.018) 
taxsscgovrev_gdp 0.13 -0.01 -0.13 0.26*** 0.01 0.28* 0.22 0.29 
 (0.093) (0.083) (0.171) (0.089) (0.050) (0.142) (0.163) (0.177) 
Expenditure Variables         
govexpwages_gdp -0.18 -0.26 -0.18 0.02 0.11 -0.24 0.28 0.32** 
 (0.144) (0.226) (0.184) (0.098) (0.152) (0.304) (0.374) (0.131) 
intpay_gdp 0.01 -0.18 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.55*** -0.01** -0.03** -0.03 
 (0.028) (0.226) (0.005) (0.007) (0.091) (0.006) (0.015) (0.026) 
subs_gdp 0.00 0.04 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.04** -0.00** -0.00 -0.01* 
 (0.004) (0.038) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) 
govcons_gdp -0.04 -0.16 0.01 0.21*** 0.16** 0.12 -0.06 0.31** 
 (0.070) (0.143) (0.104) (0.056) (0.064) (0.104) (0.208) (0.138) 
Note: The models are estimated by either Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) or system GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are used as 
suitable instruments. The dependent variable is either private investment or public investment. Different individual regressions using the set of regressors and 
controls present in table 4. (in bold) were performed and only coefficients of interest are reported for economy of space. Revenue and expenditure variables were 
included individually in each regression. Full results are available from the authors upon request. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not 




Table 5a: Investment equations with Decomposition of Government Revenues, 5-year averages – Fixed 
Effects and System-GMM 




Estimation   SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Equation I.1 I.2 I.1 I.2 
         
inigdppc -2.20 -9.06*** 28.93 2.74 -3.03*** 8.53** -0.91 -2.88** 
 (3.060) (2.826) (17.497) (2.132) (0.613) (3.021) (1.911) (1.186) 
lfp -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.30** -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.189) (0.290) (0.225) (0.112) (0.021) (0.110) (0.178) (0.113) 
popgr 4.30*** 3.52** 11.91** 0.83 1.04*** -0.25 4.69*** 1.61 
 (0.975) (1.433) (4.620) (0.757) (0.302) (1.913) (1.573) (1.058) 
depratio_wa 0.05 -0.04 -0.13 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.27*** -0.39*** -0.04 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.119) (0.056) (0.032) (0.069) (0.115) (0.090) 
Revenue Variables         
domtaxesgs_gdp -0.40 -0.00 -2.86* -0.19 -0.00 -0.76 -0.35 -0.06 
 (0.402) (0.363) (1.501) (0.407) (0.258) (0.417) (0.689) (0.304) 
taxesincome_gdp 0.96*** -0.23 -4.82 0.77*** 0.29*** -1.33 0.47 0.35** 
 (0.351) (0.567) (2.891) (0.189) (0.072) (0.997) (0.685) (0.177) 
taxproperty_gdp 0.66 -0.65 -36.29** 0.27 2.11 -5.62 1.16 1.31 
 (1.142) (0.776) (15.715) (0.708) (4.479) (3.033) (1.925) (1.189) 
taxpayroll_gdp 1.80 0.75 -13.62 1.16 -0.38 5.14** -0.86 -0.41 
 (1.226) (0.972) (12.730) (0.865) (0.508) (2.095) (2.323) (1.180) 
taxsscgovrev_gdp -0.38* 0.14 1.99 0.34*** -0.05 0.14 0.17 0.25 
 (0.203) (0.152) (1.783) (0.113) (0.079) (0.533) (0.477) (0.159) 
         
Obs. 164 54 31 131 58 27 164 131 
R-squared 0.30 0.50 0.66 0.38 0.40 0.92   
Hansen (p-value)       0.97 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)       0.23 0.65 
AB AR(2) (p-value)       0.61 0.56 
Note: The models are estimated by either Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) or Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is either private investment or public investment. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term 





Table 5b: Investment equations with Decomposition of Government Expenditures, 5-year averages – Fixed 
Effects and System-GMM 




Estimation FE (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Equation I.1 I.2 I.1 I.2 
         
inigdppc 2.92 -3.65 0.15 0.98 -0.70 3.98* -2.34* -3.94* 
 (2.795) (3.344) (5.477) (2.413) (0.676) (1.956) (1.290) (2.333) 
lfp -0.07 0.75*** -0.01 0.39** 0.09 0.51*** 0.06 0.15 
 (0.203) (0.236) (0.363) (0.176) (0.069) (0.094) (0.184) (0.134) 
popgr 1.04 2.65** 6.54 0.40*** 0.23 -1.30 0.85 0.57 
 (0.651) (1.264) (4.416) (0.149) (0.252) (1.320) (0.847) (0.545) 
depratio_wa -0.12 -0.07 -0.43 0.13 0.11** 0.49*** -0.06 -0.20 
 (0.097) (0.080) (0.398) (0.092) (0.043) (0.108) (0.108) (0.150) 
Expenditure Variables         
govexpwages_gdp -0.35 0.47* -0.43 0.88 0.15 -0.90* 0.07 0.38* 
 (0.226) (0.240) (0.450) (0.687) (0.126) (0.432) (0.279) (0.231) 
intpay_gdp -0.08 -3.63*** -1.53 -0.16 -1.31*** -1.89*** -0.47*** -0.15* 
 (0.147) (0.883) (1.010) (0.166) (0.108) (0.337) (0.178) (0.086) 
subs_gdp 0.02 0.39*** 0.52 0.05 -0.10*** -0.65*** 0.17*** -0.05* 
 (0.051) (0.133) (0.346) (0.058) (0.022) (0.118) (0.066) (0.027) 
govcons_gdp -0.26 -0.07 -0.43 -0.01 0.14 0.05 0.25 0.38 
 (0.184) (0.301) (0.392) (0.096) (0.086) (0.243) (0.309) (0.309) 
         
Obs. 221 75 48 117 59 23 221 117 
R-squared 0.19 0.62 0.29 0.11 0.60 0.96   
Hansen (p-value)       0.32 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)       0.88 0.56 
AB AR(2) (p-value)       1.00 0.71 
Note: The models are estimated by either Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) or Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is either private investment or public investment,. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term 
has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 6: Private Investment equation with Functional Decomposition of Public Expenditure when fiscal 
variables are introduced simultaneously (Panel A) and one at a time (Panel B), 5-year averages 
Dependent Variable Private Investment 
Estimation Fixed Effects (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Equation I.1 
Panel A       
govexpedu_gdp 0.31 0.29 -1.58 -2.29* 0.11 -2.28 
 (0.528) (0.428) (1.322) (1.268) (0.603) (5.028) 
govexphea_gdp 1.35* 0.27 0.33 -1.94 -0.17 1.82 
 (0.791) (0.548) (2.401) (2.338) (0.643) (6.276) 
govexpss_gdp -0.71*** -0.61*** -0.21 -0.94** -0.48** -1.82 
 (0.187) (0.176) (0.504) (0.444) (0.224) (1.661) 
       
Obs. 342 113 74 342 113 74 
R-squared 0.10 0.32 0.18    
Panel B       
govexpedu_gdp 0.01 -0.04 -0.61 -0.19 -0.31 -0.47 
 (0.140) (0.254) (0.509) (0.255) (0.373) (1.165) 
govexphea_gdp 1.14 0.08 -0.93 0.10 1.00 -3.28 
 (0.857) (0.559) (2.404) (1.859) (2.027) (2.801) 
govexpss_gdp -0.57*** -0.56*** -0.55 -2.17* -0.95** -0.71** 
 (0.182) (0.192) (0.514) (1.218) (0.401) (0.359) 
       
Note: The models are estimated by either Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) or system-GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are used as 
suitable instruments. The dependent variable is private investment. Different individual regressions using the set of regressors and controls present in table 3. (in 
bold) were performed and only coefficients of interested are reported for economy of space. Expenditure components (education, health and social security) were 
included individually in each regression. Full results are available from the authors upon request. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported 
for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
Table 7: Benchmark cross-country public investment equation with Budgetary Decomposition of 
Public Budget Balance (Revenue and Expenditure), 5-year averages – different samples with non-
linear effects of fiscal policy, according to the 3% Budget Deficit threshold 
Dependent Variable Public Investment 
Estimation Fixed Effects (within) 
Sample All 
 >3% <3% >3% <3% >3% <3% 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
inigdppc -0.73 2.17** 2.23 1.02 1.40 2.75 
 (1.475) (0.994) (3.051) (2.562) (2.134) (4.168) 
lfp 0.16 -0.05 0.20 -0.08 -0.04 0.59* 
 (0.138) (0.084) (0.209) (0.143) (0.166) (0.321) 
popgr 1.05** 0.36 1.12 4.35*** 0.07 0.42** 
 (0.430) (0.400) (1.132) (1.163) (0.728) (0.165) 
depratio_wa 0.18*** 0.10** 0.26*** -0.18 0.01 0.15 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.070) (0.141) (0.070) (0.194) 
Revenue Variables       
domtaxesgs_gdp   0.32 -0.87*   
   (0.393) (0.484)   
taxesincome_gdp   1.05** 0.21   
   (0.379) (0.355)   
taxproperty_gdp   0.64 -0.56   
   (0.586) (2.735)   
taxpayroll_gdp   0.72 2.21   
   (1.366) (1.426)   
taxsscgovrev_gdp   -0.38*** -0.07   
   (0.126) (0.312)   
Expenditure Variables       
govexpwages_gdp     0.14 2.13 
     (0.206) (2.024) 
intpay_gdp     -1.79*** -0.20 
     (0.545) (0.360) 
subs_gdp     -2.47** 0.07 
     (1.114) (0.126) 
govcons_gdp     -0.16** 0.25 
     (0.073) (0.305) 
       
Observations 205 252 61 61 52 63 
R-squared 0.20 0.05 0.60 0.49 0.34 0.21 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within). “Above” and “below” performers are classified as those having maintained an average (over 
the country’s time span) budget deficit below 3% or over 3%, respectively. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below 
each coefficient estimate. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of 










Table 8a: Panel Granger-Causality – Private Investment and GDPpc (full sample) 
Dep.Var. private Inv. pc OLS levels Within Group (FE) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument set none none Full Full Reduced Reduced 
Lag1 priv_inv_pc  0.90*** 0.35*** 0.30* 0.92*** 1.06*** 0.99*** 
 (0.052) (0.132) (0.171) (0.107) (0.083) (0.058) 
Lag1 GDPpc 0.01* 0.02*** -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.019) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
       
Obs. 862 862 723 862 862 862 
R-squared 0.96 0.43     
AB AR(1) (p-value)   0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)   0.89 0.26 0.36 0.30 
Hansen p-value   0.09 0.12 0.01 0.02 
Granger causality p-value 0.06 0.01 .00 .05 0.00 0.00 
LR effect point estimate .07*** .03*** -.03 .07* -.01 .31 
(standard error) (.004) (.007) (.032) (.040) (.058) 1.06 
Note: Our five-year averages dataset was used for the purpose of assessing Granger causality. Year dummies are included in all models (coefficients not reported). 
Figures in parenthesis below point estimates are standard-errors. The GMM results reported here are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. The Hansen test is used to assess the overidentifying restrictions; the test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM 
estimator. The difference Hansen test is used to test the additional moment conditions used by the system GMM estimators in which SYS GMM uses the standard 
moment conditions, while SYS GMM-1 only uses the lagged first-differences of private investment dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels and SYS-2 only 
uses lagged first-differences of per capita GDP dated t-2 (and earlier) as instruments in levels.. The Granger causality test examines the null hypothesis that 
private investment is not Granger-caused by per capita GDP; the test statistic is criterion based, using restricted and unrestricted models (see main text for details). 
The LR effect is the point estimate of the long-run effect of per capita GDP on private investment. Its standard error is approximated using the delta method. *, 





Table 8b: Panel Granger-Causality – GDPpc and Private Investment (full sample) 
Dep.Var. GDPpc OLS levels Within Group (FE) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM-1 SYS-GMM-2 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument set none none Full Full Reduced Reduced 
Lag1 GDPpc 1.00*** 0.84*** 0.25* 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.93*** 
 (0.007) (0.042) (0.129) (0.032) (0.043) (0.027) 
Lag1 priv_inv_pc 0.15 0.03 -0.03 1.60*** 1.66** 1.70*** 
 (0.092) (0.373) (0.540) (0.508) (0.816) (0.547) 
       
Obs. 894 894 732 894 894 894 
R-squared 0.99 0.81     
AB AR(1) (p-value)   0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 
AB AR(2) (p-value)   0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen p-value   0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Granger causality p-value 0.11 0.93 1.00 .00 0.00 0.00 
LR effect point estimate 1.17*** .87*** -.03 35.62** 65.13 25.32*** 
(standard error) (.119) (.307) (.731) (17.063) (85.580) (4.981) 





Table 9: Private and Public Investment equations with Government Expenditures and Revenues – accounting for Cross-Sectional Dependence, 5 year averages data 
– OECD  
 
Dep.Var. Private Investment Public Investment 
Estimation Discroll Kraay Robust Estimation CCEP Discroll Kraay Robust Estimation CCEP 
Model 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 
Sample OECD 
                 
inigdppc -2.57*** -2.49*** -3.08*** -3.16*** -5.52*** -4.43*** -5.51*** -4.54*** -3.27*** -3.38*** -3.58*** -3.15*** 3.82** 4.26** 3.20* 3.54** 
 (0.225) (0.189) (0.073) (0.098) (1.010) (0.982) (1.521) (0.978) (0.564) (0.526) (0.450) (0.546) (1.613) (1.590) (1.569) (1.512) 
lfp 0.05** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.19** 0.20** 0.34*** 0.22** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.18 0.16 0.27 0.19 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.089) (0.088) (0.125) (0.094) (0.027) (0.027) (0.013) (0.024) (0.227) (0.205) (0.212) (0.231) 
popgr 1.18 1.39 1.17*** 1.69*** 2.40*** 2.26*** 1.64* 2.24*** -0.10 0.14 -1.33*** -0.56 2.32* 2.24* 2.24* 2.69* 
 (1.251) (0.921) (0.138) (0.599) (0.611) (0.601) (0.876) (0.585) (0.501) (0.408) (0.241) (0.589) (1.071) (1.025) (1.175) (1.266) 
depratio_wa -0.19** -0.20** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.12** -0.10* -0.08 -0.10* -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.14** 0.13** 0.13* 0.12* 
 (0.082) (0.085) (0.072) (0.075) (0.051) (0.052) (0.068) (0.053) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.058) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059) 
totgovrev_gdp -0.09    -0.14***    0.04***    -0.07    
 (0.058)    (0.045)    (0.012)    (0.102)    
totgovexp_gdp  -0.06    -0.04    0.07***    -0.22   
  (0.041)    (0.054)    (0.016)    (0.186)   
totgovrevgr   71.03***    32.28**    14.32    4.09  
   (6.757)    (15.294)    (10.776)    (21.336)  
totgovexpgr    75.19    34.46*    10.95    -20.11 
    (47.260)    (18.176)    (11.140)    (35.996) 
                 
Obs. 169 180 122 174 169 180 122 174 135 135 102 134 20 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.78 
Note: The models are estimated with either Driscoll Kraay robust estimator or the Pesaran’s Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator (CCPE) to correct for the existence of cross-sectional dependence in the OECD. The dependent variable is 
either private of public investment levels (% GDP), as identified in the first row. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** 





Table 10: Benchmark cross-country private investment equation and fiscal rules, 5-year averages 
 
Dependent Variable Public Investment 
Estimation FE (within) 
Sample EU 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Equation I.2 I.2 <60%debt to GDP ratio I.2 >60%debt to GDP ratio 
          
l.real GDPpc 0.31* 0.12 0.35** 0.34* 0.32* 0.39* 0.29 -0.04 0.29 
 (0.151) (0.188) (0.132) (0.130) (0.116) (0.165) (0.213) (0.278) (0.200) 
lfp 0.02* 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
popgr 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.06** 0.05** 0.07** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.028) (0.044) (0.050) (0.040) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) 
depratio_wa -0.01** -0.02** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02** -0.03** -0.02** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
fisrulov -0.03*   -0.02   -0.04*   
 (0.015)   (0.012)   (0.021)   
exprulov  0.01   -0.01   0.05  
  (0.011)   (0.008)   (0.034)  
bbdrulov   -0.05**   -0.03   -0.05** 
   (0.016)   (0.021)   (0.017) 
          
Obs. 210 210 210 75 75 75 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.51 0.48 0.54 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) The dependent variable is public investment,. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** 




















Appendix A – Variables and sources 
 
Table A1 – Variable definitions 
Variable Definition/Description Acronym Source 
real GDP per capita  
Gdppc 
World Bank’s Word 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
gross fixed capital formation (% 
GDP) 
 Gfcf_gdp WDI 
public investment (% GDP)  Pubinv_gdp WDI 
Government budget surplus or 
deficit (% of GDP)  
 
The government budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP. 
Govbal_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Central Government Debt (% 
GDP) 
 Govdebt_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Total Government Revenue (% 
GDP) 
Total government revenue, excluding grants, as a percentage of GDP Totgovrev_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Tax revenue (% GDP)  Taxrev_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Domestic taxes on goods and 
services (% GDP) 
This includes VAT, excises, profits of fiscal monopoly etc. 
 Domtaxesgs_gdp 
WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly 
(2001) 
Taxes on payroll or work force 
(% of GDP) 
This category consists of taxes that are collected from employers or the self-
employed and that are not earmarked for social security schemes. Taxpayrool_gdp 
WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly 
(2001) 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains (% GDP) 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a percentage of GDP. Taxincome_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Taxes on property (% of GDP) Taxes on the use, ownership, or transfer of wealth 
 Taxproperty_gdp 
WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly 
(2001) 
Tax and social security 
contributions government 
revenue (% of 
GDP) 
Total government revenue from taxes and social security contributions 
Taxssgovrev_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Total Government Expenditure 
(% GDP) 
Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Totgovexp_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Compensation of employees (% 
GDP) 
 Govexpwages_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Interest Payments (% GDP)  Inpay_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Subsidies (% GDP)  Subs_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public Final Consumption 
Expenditure (% GDP) 
 Govcons_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public spending on Education 
(% GDP) 
Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. Govexpedu_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public spending on Health (% 
GDP) 
Government expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP. Govexphea_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
Public spending on Social 
Security and Welfare related (% 
GDP) 
Government expenditure on social security and welfare as a percentage of 
GDP. Govexpss_gdp WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001) 
School attainment average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old from the 
international data on educational attainment Edu Barro and Lee (2010) 
literacy rate (% of people ages 
15 to 24) 
 Literates WDI 
primary school enrolment (% 
gross) 
 Primary_enrol WDI 
primary school duration (years)  Primary_dur WDI 
secondary school enrolment (% 
gross) 
 Secondaru_enrol WDI 
secondary  school duration 
(years) 
 Secondary_dur WDI 
tertiary school enrolment (% 
gross) 
 Tertiary_enrol WDI 
tertiary school duration (years)  Tertiary_dur WDI 
land area (in square kilometres)  Land_area WDI 
population  
 
 Pop WDI 
imports and exports of good and 
services (BoP, current USD) 
 Imp, exp WDI 
labor participation rate (% of 
total) 
 Lfp WDI 
labor force  Laborf WDI 
unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force) 
 Unemp WDI 
fertility rate (births per woman)  Fertility WDI 
age dependency ratio (% of 
working age population) 
 Depratio_wa WDI 
urban population (% of total)  Urban_pop WDI 
terms of trade adjustment 
(constant LCU) 
 Terms_trade WDI 
real effective exchange rate 
index (2000=100) 






Table B1: Benchmark cross-country investment equations, 5-year averages (including time period 
dummies) – LSDV-C 
 
Dependent Variable Private Investment Public Investment
Estimation LSDV-C 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg 
Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Equation I.1 I.2 
       
inigdppc -3.40*** -2.72*** 2.01 0.04 -0.16 2.44* 
 (0.663) (0.884) (1.307) (0.867) (0.523) (1.347) 
lfp -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 
 (0.060) (0.071) (0.100) (0.074) (0.049) (0.103) 
popgr 1.46*** 2.51*** 1.44*** 0.49* 1.01*** -0.32 
 (0.227) (0.529) (0.398) (0.249) (0.275) (0.855) 
depratio_wa -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.01 0.08*** 0.03 0.19*** 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.049) (0.030) (0.023) (0.053) 
       
Obs. 980 202 193 479 146 98 
Note: The models are estimated with Brunos’ (2005) Least Squares Dummy Variable (corrected) estimator. The dependent variable is either private investment or 
public investment,. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been 
estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
